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THE CHARACTER OF THE GOVERNMENTAL ACTION
Thomas W. MerriHlt
INTRODUCTION
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City holds a secure
position in the architecture of the regulatory takings doctrine.' That doctrine
is at bottom a tool for distinguishing between different governmental
powers; in particular, between the power of eminent domain and the police
power. Because eminent domain requires that compensation be paid,
whereas the police power does not, it is necessary to draw a line between
these powers. Conceivably we could simply take the legislature at its word
as to which power it is exercising. But at least since Pennsylvania Coal Co.
v. Mahon, the Supreme Court has insisted independent judicial review is
required to assure that when the government purports to be exercising the
police power (or the power to tax) it is not in fact exercising the power of
eminent domain.2 Hence the regulatory takings doctrine, which is designed
to identify those exercises of governmental power that are functionally
equivalent to eminent domain and therefore require the payment of just
compensation.
As described in recent decisions, most prominently Lingle v. Chevron
U.S.A. Inc., the Court appears to understand the power of eminent domain
and the police power to be arrayed along a spectrum. At one end we have
clear cases of eminent domain, as where the government condemns and
takes title to private property for some public project. At the other end, we
have clear cases of the police power, as where the government makes it a
crime to discharge toxic wastes into the city water supply.6 The task in
contested cases is to determine whether the challenged action resides closer
to the eminent domain end of the spectrum, where compensation is
required, or to the police power end of the spectrum, where it is not.
The Court has devised two general decisional tools for engaging in this
process of classification. One tool consists of "categorical" rules that situate
certain types of governmental actions as being conclusively at one end of
* Charles Evans Hughes Professor, Columbia Law School.
Many thanks to Dan Boyle for research assistance.
1. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
2. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
3. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005).
4. Id. at 538.
5. See, e.g., United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 239 (1946) (condemning one and one-
half acres of land as a site for a post office and customhouse).
6. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029-30 (1992).
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the spectrum or the other. Thus, when the government authorizes a
permanent physical occupation of property or imposes a regulation that
deprives property of all economically beneficial use, these actions fall
within categorical rules that conclusively identify these actions as being
near the eminent domain end of the spectrum. The Court has been less
explicit about identifying categorical rules that place governmental actions
at the police power end of the spectrum. But clearly there are such rules,
such as the "navigational servitude," which tells us that dredging a river to
improve navigation is never a taking,8 or the understanding that forfeitures
of property used in a criminal enterprise do not give rise to takings
liability.9
What then about the gray area that lies in the middle of the spectrum,
where no categorical rule applies? This is where the second general
decisional tool, associated with Penn Central, kicks in. The Court in Penn
Central described regulatory takings law as entailing "essentially ad hoc,
factual inquiries." 0 Although it is possible to read the opinion as assuming
that all regulatory takings inquiries would proceed in this fashion,
subsequent decisions have made it clear that the "ad hoc" analysis is
reserved for especially difficult cases not covered by any of the categorical
rules clustered at either end of the spectrum." As such, Penn Central
obviously plays a critical role in regulatory takings law; it describes the
decision rule for the hardest cases.
Although Penn Central's importance in the architecture of regulatory
takings law is secure, the content of the test Penn Central prescribes for
resolving the most difficult cases has proven to be problematic.
Immediately after describing regulatory takings law as entailing ad hoc
factual inquiries, Penn Central observed that previous decisions had
identified "several factors that have particular significance" to such an
inquiry.12 These were described as follows:
7. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 421 (1982) (permanent
occupations); Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015 (preventing the construction of permanent structures on
beachfront island property).
8. United States v. Cherokee Nation of Okla., 480 U.S. 700, 707-08 (1987).
9. Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 452 (1996).
10. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
11. See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'1 Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,
342 (2002) (holding that a building moratorium, not being covered by a categorical rule, should be
assessed under the Penn Central standard); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 630-31 (2001)
(holding that a wetland preservation rule in effect when an owner acquired the property, not being
covered by a categorical rule of non-liability, should be assessed under the Penn Central standard).
12. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
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The economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and,
particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with
distinct investment-backed expectations are, of course, relevant
considerations. So, too, is the character of the governmental
action. A "taking" may more readily be found when the
interference with property can be characterized as a physical
invasion by government than when interference arises from some
public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic
life to promote the common good.13
Each of the factors mentioned in this passage has created great
difficulty for the lower courts. The first factor-the extent of diminution in
value caused by the governmental action-presents a dilemma about the
unit of property used to measure diminution. 14 Defining the relevant unit
broadly reduces the extent of diminution; defining the relevant unit
narrowly increases it. Although it may be possible to develop guidelines for
identifying the relevant unit of property, so far the Supreme Court has failed
to do so.15 The second factor-whether the action undermines investment-
backed expectations-is problematic because it is largely circular. One's
expectations about the durability of a government rule or practice are
significantly shaped by whether the Constitution requires compensation if
the rule or practice is abandoned. 6 That being the case, one cannot use
''expectations" as an independent ground to ask whether compensation is
required. The third factor-the character of the governmental action-is the
most mysterious of all.'7 It is the subject of this Article.
13. Id. (citing Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962); United States v. Causby, 328
U.S. 256 (1946)).
14. E.g., John E. Fee, Comment, Unearthing the Denominator in Regulatory Takings Claims,
61 U. CHI. L. REv. 1535, 1536 (1994); Keith Woffinden, The Parcel As a Whole: A Presumptive
Structural Approach for Determining When the Government Has Gone Too Far, 2008 BYU L. REV.
623, 636-37; Danaya C. Wright, A New Time for Denominators: Toward a Dynamic Theory ofProperty
in Regulatory Takings Relevant Parcel Analysis, 34 ENvTL. L. 175, 190-93 (2004).
15. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 n.7 (1992) (acknowledging the
failure). One solution might be to ask whether the interest taken by the government constitutes a bundle
of rights that would ordinarily have to be purchased if it were acquired by a private party. Saul Levmore,
Takings, Torts, and Special Interests, 77 VA. L. REV. 1333, 1340-41 (1991). This would effectively
jettison any diminution inquiry and replace it with an inquiry into whether the government has taken a
unit of property that is exchangeable on a stand-alone basis. DAVID A. DANA & THOMAS W. MERRILL,
PROPERTY: TAKINGS 76-81 (2002); see also Steven J. Eagle, Property Tests, Due Process Tests and
Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence, 2007 BYU L. REV. 899, 939-43 (urging adoption of a "commercial
unit" test in lieu of the current diminution inquiry).
16. See Michael J. Graetz, Legal Transitions: The Case of Retroactivity in Income Tax
Revision, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 47, 64 (1977).
17. See John D. Echeverria, Making Sense of Penn Central, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,471, 10,477
(2009) (describing the current understanding of the term "character" as a "veritable mess").
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In stating that the "character of the governmental action" is a relevant
factor, the Court immediately illustrated what it meant by contrasting a
physical invasion by the government with what it described as a "public
program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the
common good."18 This explanation of the "character" factor poses a further
question: Did Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, envision the character
inquiry as entailing a single-variable distinction between invasions and land
use regulations? Or was the character factor seen as a more open-ended
category, encompassing a variety of potentially relevant variables, of which
the distinction between invasion and regulation was simply one particularly
relevant variable given the historic preservation statute at issue in Penn
Central?
Whatever Justice Brennan may have intended in Penn Central, the
Supreme Court has done relatively little in subsequent decisions to clarify
the meaning of the "character of the governmental action." The Court's
regulatory takings decisions since Penn Central have been largely devoted
to determining when the ad hoc approach does or does not apply, not to
spelling out how it applies when it does.' 9 This may change. The process of
identifying new categorical rules to supplement the Penn Central test
appears to have ground to a halt. The Court has declined to extend the
20- *
permanent occupation categorical test beyond easements. It has limited
the economic wipeout categorical test to permanent deprivations of
economic value. 2 1 And it has scotched the idea that regulations that fail to
substantially advance a legitimate governmental interest should be regarded
as takings.2 2 So it is not implausible to imagine that property rights
advocates and their judicial sympathizers, after a long period of casting
about for new or expanded categorical rules, will turn their attention back to
18. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. The Court referenced United States v. Causby, 328 U.S.
256, 261-62 (1946), a decision holding the government liable for low-level airplane flights, as an
example of government invasion of property. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
19. F. Patrick Hubbard et al., Do Owners Have a Fair Chance of Prevailing Under the Ad-Hoc
Regulatory Takings Test of Penn Central Transportation Company?, 14 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F.
121, 121-22 (2003).
20. Compare Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 532 (1992) (declining to extend Loretto
to a lease modification), and FCC v. Fla. Power Corp., 480 U.S. 245, 250-53 (1987) (stating that
Loretto has "no application to the facts of this litigation"), with Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374,
384 (1994) (applying Loretto to an imposition of an easement of indefinite duration), and Nollan v. Cal.
Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 831-32 (1987) (holding that a "permanent and continuous right to pass
to and fro" over someone's real property constitutes a "permanent physical occupation").
21. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 331
(2002) (declining to extend Lucas to a building moratorium).
22. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 532 (2005).
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Penn Central. When they do, the most promising place to seek to expand on
protection for owners will be the ill-defined character factor.
If the Supreme Court does decide to revisit the character factor, lower
court decisions provide a rich source of material for particularizing this
aspect of the Penn Central standard. The emerging jurisprudence in the
lower courts is more consistent with the open-ended interpretation of the
character factor than with the understanding that the factor incorporates a
single-variable distinction between invasion and regulation. Although
untidy, the open-ended construction, I believe, is also a better way to
develop the ad hoc regulatory takings inquiry associated with Penn Central.
If the central objective is to identify regulations that are the functional
equivalent of condemnations of property under the power of eminent
domain, as the Supreme Court tells us in Lingle, then history offers more
factors that are relevant to the inquiry than the three variables listed in the
much-quoted paragraph in Penn Central. Treating the character factor as
embracing a multiplicity of considerations is thus a constructive doctrinal
development moving the law in the right direction.
I. PENN CENTRAL ON THE CHARACTER OF THE GOVERNMENTAL ACTION
Although the iconic paragraph in Penn Central referring to diminution
in value, investment-backed expectations, and the character of the
governmental action is often the only portion of the opinion cited in cases
that apply the ad hoc approach to regulatory takings, the opinion went on to
say more about the character factor. Indeed, the next subpart of the opinion
included four additional paragraphs devoted to the character analysis. 23
These paragraphs do not conclusively resolve the ambiguity about what the
Court intended by referring to the character of the governmental action. But
on the whole they are more consistent with the open-ended construction
than the reductive single-variable idea.
One paragraph picked up on the idea of governmental invasions, again
with specific reference to United States v. Causby, which had been heavily
relied upon by the owners of the railroad terminal in Penn Central. Here the
opinion made an unmistakable reference to the scholarship of Joseph Sax,24
observing that the government in Causby was acting in an "enterprise
capacity" and had appropriated the airspace above the Causbys' land for
purposes of flights by military planes landing and taking off at a nearby
23. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124-26.
24. See Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 63, 69 (1964) (arguing
that takings law should distinguish between government "enterprise" and government as "arbiter").
2012] 653
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military airport. 25 The present case, the Court said, was "not remotely" the
same.2 6 The city had simply prohibited the landowners or anyone else from
"occupying portions of the airspace above the [t]erminal, while permitting
[them] to use the remainder of [their property] in a gainful fashion." 27
Standing alone, this paragraph might support the single-variable invasion-
versus-regulation interpretation, although the invocation of Professor Sax's
test that distinguishes between enterprise and arbitration does not
completely map onto this distinction.
The other paragraphs loosely grouped together under a discussion of
the character of the governmental action all involved distinctions among
different types of land use regulations. In one paragraph, Justice Brennan
responded to the contention that historic preservation is a form of
discriminatory or "reverse spot" zoning.28 He concluded, to the contrary,
that historic preservation, at least as implemented in New York, "embodies
a comprehensive plan" affecting a large number of parcels.29 The final two
paragraphs addressed the claim that New York's law failed to impose
"identical or similar restrictions on all structures located in particular
physical communities," and was thus "inherently incapable of producing [a]
fair and equitable distribution of benefits and burdens of governmental
action."3 o Justice Brennan offered two responses. The more general
rejoinder was that "zoning laws often affect some property owners more
severely than others but have not been held to be invalid on that account."3
The opinion also offered a more factually specific rejoinder: The New York
law applied to thirty-one historic districts and over 400 individual
landmarks, and thus the preservation program benefitted all citizens in New
York, including the objecting owners.32
Taken together, the paragraphs devoted to the "character of the
governmental action" could be read as saying little more than that the
preservation ordinance in Penn Central was a land use regulation and did
not entail any governmental invasion of the appellants' property. But they
can also be read as saying that a variety of considerations are relevant in
assessing the character of the governmental action, including whether it is
comprehensive, applies neutral and general criteria, does not single out
particular owners for special treatment, and provides benefits to all
25. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 135.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 132.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 133.
31. Id. at 133-34.
32. Id at 134-35.
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members of the community. I am inclined to the more inclusive reading, on
the ground that if nothing more than invasion versus use regulation was
intended, the discussion could have been much shorter. But the matter is
admittedly inconclusive.
II. POST-PENN CENTRAL SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
After Penn Central, the Supreme Court has done relatively little to
clarify what it meant by the character of the governmental action-or for
that matter what it meant by any of the three factors. One reason for this
neglect is the penchant in constitutional law, at least when Penn Central
was decided, for what Robert Nagel has called "formulaic" tests.3 It is far
from clear that Justice Brennan's opinion in Penn Central contemplated
that a standard of three variables would govern ad hoc takings inquiries. Yet
the intellectual fashions of the day demanded three- and four-part tests. Sure
enough, Penn Central was soon restated as a three-part formula, with the
implication that courts were to analyze each of the factors and then weigh
them together to reach a final judgment about the proper classification of
the challenged action.34 Somewhat paradoxically, this led to an ossification
of the doctrine. Rather than agonize over what any factor meant-a
question of law open to further appellate review-lower courts generally
eschewed definitive pronouncements about the meaning of any given factor,
since each could be balanced against the other two equally opaque factors to
reach virtually any outcome in any case. Seeing no conflicts in the lower
courts about the meaning of the Penn Central standard, the Court had little
occasion to revisit the meaning of the factors.
Another reason for the neglect of Penn Central is the two-part ripeness
requirement for regulatory takings cases set forth in Williamson County
33. Robert F. Nagel, The Formulaic Constitution, 84 MICH. L. REv. 165, 165 (1985).
34. Takings cases decided shortly after Penn Central cited the decision but did not treat it as
adopting a formal three-part test for assessing regulatory takings claims. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51,
67-68 (1979); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979). The process of formalization
began with PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980), was solidified by Ruckelshaus
v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005 (1984) and Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S.
211, 225 (1986), and eventually became a matter of rote recitation, e.g., Concrete Pipe & Prods., Inc. v.
Constr. Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 643-45 (1993).
35. Cases presenting challenges to bans on outdoor advertising signs illustrate this point in
particular. Compare Naegele Outdoor Adver., Inc. v. City of Durham, 803 F. Supp. 1068, 1078-80
(M.D.N.C. 1992) (applying Penn Central and holding that a city ordinance prohibiting outdoor
advertising did not constitute a regulatory taking), with Ga. Outdoor Adver., Inc. v. City of Waynesville,
690 F. Supp. 452, 458 (W.D.N.C. 1988) (applying Penn Central and holding that a substantially similar
ordinance did constitute a regulatory taking). See also Outdoor Graphics, Inc. v City of Burlington, 103
F.3d 690, 695 (8th Cir. 1996) (examining an ordinance similar to those in Naegele and Waynesville, but
grounding its holding on different factors).
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Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank.3 Williamson County
held that regulatory takings claims, at least of the as-applied variety, nearly
always have to be channeled through the state courts to determine the final
form of the regulation and whether compensation is available under state
law." Under this understanding, unless the Supreme Court agrees to hear
the case on certiorari after all the uncertainties are resolved, any federal
constitutional issues decided in the state courts are barred from re-litigation
in federal court. And since most of the cases that survived the Williamson
County gauntlet could be portrayed as "fact specific" applications of the
established Penn Central three-factor test, easy arguments were usually
available to deny further Supreme Court review.
Perhaps most importantly, property rights activists and their judicial
sympathizers quickly came to view Penn Central as a graveyard for takings
claims. The three factors mentioned by Penn Central were designed to
support the conclusion that a New York City law that operated like an ex
post preservation easement was not a taking. The application of the same
three factors by the lower courts in later cases seemed to confirm that not
much else was a taking either.4 0 Rather than invest energy in clarifying the
Penn Central test, property rights activists quickly redirected their efforts
onto a different path. First, in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp.41 and later in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,42 the Court
recognized new "categorical" grounds for identifying a regulatory taking.
The combined effect was largely to divert the attention away from Penn
Central toward the interpretation of these new categorical takings doctrines
and the possible development of additional categorical rules. This too meant
that the Court gave relatively little attention to refining the Penn Central
test, including the character factor.
Notwithstanding this general neglect of Penn Central and the proper
meaning of its "factors," the Court has decided a number of cases that bear
36. Williamson Cnty. Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 186, 194 (1985).
37. Id.
38. San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 338 (2005).
39. See Kevin H. Smith, Certiorari and the Supreme Court Agenda: An Empirical Analysis, 54
OKLA. L. REv. 727, 740 (2001) ("[C]ertain types of legal errors, such as an erroneous factual finding or
the misapplication of a properly stated rule of law, are unlikely to result in a petition for a writ of
certiorari being granted." (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also SUP. CT. R. 10 ("A petition for a
writ of certiorari is rarely granted when the asserted error consists of... the misapplication of a properly
stated rule of law.").
40. One random sampling of 133 takings cases citing to Penn Central (roughly 10% of the total
number at that time) found that plaintiffs prevailed in only 13.4% of cases applying the Penn Central
test. Hubbard et al., supra note 19, at 141.
41. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982).
42. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992).
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on the central ambiguity about the character factor: Does it incorporate a
single variable distinction between invasion and regulation, or a wider set
of considerations? Although it is possible to cite decisions that appear to
presuppose the single-variable understanding, 43 the cumulative weight of
these decisions comes down decisively on the side of the more open-ended
understanding.
The Court decided two cases shortly after Penn Central that involved
governmental invasions of property. Interestingly, neither decision treated
the fact of the "invasion" as a factor to be assessed under the Penn Central
balancing test.
The first invasion case, Kaiser Aetna v. United States, came close on
the heels of Penn Central." It involved a takings challenge to an order of
the Army Corps of Engineers requiring the opening of a privately
developed marina in Hawaii to the general public. Then-Justice Rehnquist,
writing for the Court, identified the challenged order as imposing "an actual
physical invasion of the privately owned marina."45 Nevertheless, he did not
treat the invasive nature of the governmental action as a factor to be
weighed under Penn Central. Instead, he emphasized that the order
abrogated the owners' right to exclude, something "universally held to be a
fundamental element of the property right."" One should perhaps not make
too much of this. Penn Central had not yet come to be regarded as a
formalized three-part test, and Justice Rehnquist, who had dissented in
Penn Central, was perhaps not eager to treat the decision as a foundational
precedent. In retrospect, Kaiser Aetna is probably best regarded as a way
station to the decision in Loretto, with its categorical rule about permanent
occupations, rather than an application of the character factor of Penn
Central.
Loretto, the other post-Penn Central case dealing with invasions, also
declined to treat the invasive nature of the governmental action as merely a
factor to be weighed under Penn Central. The Court acknowledged the
relevance of invasions under the character factor of Penn Central, but went
on to carve out a special rule for what it called "permanent physical
occupations":
43. E.g., Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 225 (1986). For early lower
court decisions that appear to share this understanding, see, for example, Hilton Wash. Corp. v. District
of Columbia, 777 F.2d 47, 49 (D.C. Cir. 1985) and Barbian v. Panagis, 694 F.2d 476, 485-86 (6th Cir.
1982) (citing Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)).
44. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
45. Id. at 180.
46. Id at 179-80.
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As Penn Central affirms, the Court has often upheld
substantial regulation of an owner's use of his own property
where deemed necessary to promote the public interest. At the
same time, we have long considered a physical intrusion by
government to be a property restriction of an unusually serious
character for purposes of the Takings Clause. Our cases further
establish that when the physical intrusion reaches the extreme
form of a permanent physical occupation, a taking has occurred.
In such a case, "the character of the government action" not only
is an important factor in resolving whether the action works a
taking but also is determinative.47
Loretto thus seems to reaffirm that the character factor is about
invasions versus regulations, with permanent invasions being such an
extreme type of invasion that the analysis can stop at that point without
considering other factors. With the benefit of hindsight, Loretto's
significance in understanding the character factor is arguably rather
different. Once we assimilate the idea that there is an ad hoc takings test
and categorical takings tests, and that one of the categorical tests involves
government-sanctioned invasions, it seems odd that invasions would also be
one of the three factors considered under the ad hoc approach. To be sure,
one can distinguish between "permanent" invasions (categorical) and less-
than-permanent invasions (ad hoc). Or can one? Very little in property law
is "permanent" in the sense of lasting forever. What Loretto seems to have
had in mind by a permanent occupation, with the benefit of later clarifying
decisions, is governmental action that amounts to the imposition of an
easement of indefinite duration.4 8 If all invasions that fit this description are
taken out of the ad hoc analysis, then there is not much left of the character
analysis if all it refers to is invasions versus regulations. In this sense,
Loretto pushes us toward a broader understanding of the character factor in
order to avoid trivializing it.
Soon, other decisions were rendered that cannot be squared with the
single-variable understanding of the character factor. The first was Hodel v.
Irving.49 At issue was a federal statute that attempted to reduce the
fragmentation of ownership interests in Indian tribal lands subject to the
47. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982).
48. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994) (noting that a government
requirement that a property owner dedicate a strip of land as a public pedestrian/bicycle path would be a
taking "[w]ithout question"); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 832 (1987) (holding that a
categorical taking occurs under Loretto "where individuals are given a permanent and continuous right
to pass to and fro, so that the real property may continuously be traversed, even though no particular
individual is permitted to station himself permanently upon the premises").
49. Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987).
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allotment system by decreeing that small fractional interests not disposed of
by will would escheat to the tribe.so In an opinion by Justice O'Connor
applying the Penn Central test, the Court held this was a taking." Since the
interests were very small, neither diminution in value nor investment-
backed expectations pointed toward a taking. So naturally, Justice
O'Connor stressed the "extraordinary" character of the governmental
action.52 The law, she said, "amounts to virtually the abrogation of the right
to pass on a certain type of property-the small undivided interest-to
one's heirs."" Justice O'Connor seemed to be saying that governmental
regulations that are inconsistent with longstanding and widely shared ideas
about the prerogatives of ownership are suspect under the character factor.
The decision has not been read so broadly. It is largely treated as
establishing a special rule for abrogation of inheritance rights. 5 4 Insofar as it
illuminates the understanding of the character factor, however, Irving is
obviously inconsistent with the single-variable understanding; it can be
integrated with the larger landscape of the law only by interpreting the
character factor as a much broader catch-all.
Another O'Connor opinion, this time for a plurality of four in Eastern
Enterprises v. Apfel, also departed from the single-variable invasion-versus-
regulation construction of the character factor.55 Her opinion would have
found a federal statute imposing retroactive liability for retiree health care
benefits to be a taking under the Penn Central test. Most of the analysis
focused on investment-backed expectations. Justice O'Connor did note,
however, that the nature of the governmental action was "quite unusual" in
that it "singles out certain employers to bear a burden that is substantial in
amount" for conduct far in the past." This, she said, was fundamentally
unfair: "Eastern cannot be forced to bear the expense of lifetime health
benefits for miners based on its activities decades before those benefits
were promised."58 The plurality opinion in Eastern Enterprises therefore
suggests that retroactive regulations are suspect under the character factor.
50. Id. at 709.
51. Id at 714-18.
52. Id. at 716.
53. Id.
54. Youpee v. Babbitt, 67 F.3d 194, 199-200 (9th Cir. 1995), aff'd, 519 U.S. 234 (1997). An
exception is Philip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly, 312 F.3d 24, 41-45 (1st Cir. 2002), which treated Irving as
having created a virtually categorical rule of takings liability for "extraordinary" regulations that
extinguish a traditional attribute of private property. But Philip Morris appears to stand alone in reading
the decision this broadly.
55. E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998) (plurality opinion).
56. Id. at 529-37.




Again, this is inconsistent with the single-variable interpretation and
presupposes that the character factor is something like a big tent
encompassing a variety of considerations.
Perhaps the decisions of greatest significance in terms of bending the
understanding of the character factor are Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass 'n v.
DeBenedictis 9 and Lucas. Both reaffirm that whether the regulation tracks
the common law of nuisance is relevant in determining whether it is a
taking. In Keystone, the Court essentially overruled Pennsylvania Coal Co.
v. Mahon and adopted Justice Brandeis's dissent in that case, holding that a
Pennsylvania statute prohibiting mining activity that causes surface
subsidence is not a taking because it regulates activity that tracks nuisance
law.60 The Court said this feature went to "the nature of the State's action,"
which "is critical in takings analysis."6' Keystone also revived another
Holmes chestnut: Regulations imposing an average "reciprocity of
advantage" on landowners will ordinarily not be considered takings. The
Court observed that its historical "hesitance to find a taking when the State
merely restrains uses of property that are tantamount to public nuisances is
consistent with the notion of [average] 'reciprocity of advantage' that
Justice Holmes referred to in Pennsylvania Coal."63
Lucas, for its part, recognized a categorical taking based on a total
elimination of economic value but then immediately recognized what
appears to be a categorical exception for regulations that track the common
law of nuisance in the jurisdiction.6 If correspondence with nuisance law is
a categorical exception to a categorical rule of liability, then a fortiori it
should be a relevant factor under the ad hoc analysis of Penn Central.
Taken together, Keystone and Lucas necessarily mean that a regulation's
correspondence to nuisance law is germane to regulatory takings analysis.
And Keystone, while not entirely clear on the matter, seems to situate the
nuisance-tracking feature in the character prong of Penn Central.
In no post-Penn Central decision has the Court undertaken to offer an
explicit interpretation of what it meant by "the character of the
governmental action." Nevertheless, a significant number of decisions
clearly presuppose that the character factor means more than the single
variable distinction between invasion and regulation.
59. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
60. Id. at 492.
61. Id. at 488.
62. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 422 (1922).
63. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 491 (quoting Pa. Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 422).
64. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1031 (1992).
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III. LOWER COURT DECISIONS
With minimal guidance from the Supreme Court, lower courts have
been left largely to their own devices in exploring the meaning of the
character factor under the Penn Central test. Overall, it is possible to
identify six themes or ideas-one could perhaps call them sub-factors-that
lower courts have developed in the wake of Penn Central in giving further
content to the character of the governmental action. One of these sub-
factors-whether the regulation substantially advances a legitimate
governmental interest-was the product of a head-fake by the Supreme
Court that has now been repudiated," and will likely disappear. The
remaining five are alive and well, at least in certain jurisdictions.
A. Invasion
Perhaps the most common theme is that the character factor simply
incorporates a distinction between governmental invasions and use
regulations. This is usually stated in summary fashion, in decisions that
otherwise conclude that the diminution in value and investment-backed
expectation tests do not favor the property owner.66 If something like a
wetland regulation or re-zoning is involved, then the coup de grace to the
takings challenge can be delivered by pointing out that there has been no
governmental invasion, and hence the character factor also points toward no
taking.67 These decisions treat this reading of the character factor as self-
evident. As such they are relevant data points, but they offer nothing by
way of analysis that is especially illuminating.
B. Nuisance
Other decisions consider whether the regulation tracks the common law
of nuisance as part of the character analysis. These decisions are more
interesting because the majority opinion in Penn Central says nothing about
the relevance of nuisance law. The obvious reason for this silence was that
the New York City historic preservation ordinance did not conform to the
65. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 532 (2005).
66. See, e.g., Get Away Club, Inc. v. Coleman, 969 F.2d 664, 667 (8th Cir. 1992); Rogers v.
Bucks Cnty. Domestic Relations Section, 959 F.2d 1268, 1275 (3d Cir. 1992).
67. See, e.g., K & K Constr., Inc. v. Dep't of Env. Quality, 705 N.W.2d 365, 383-84 (Mich.
Ct. App. 2005) (wetland regulation); Kafka v. Mont. Dep't of Fish, Wildlife & Parks, 201 P.3d 8, 30
(Mont. 2008) (hunting regulation); Sheffield Dev. Co. v. City of Glenn Heights, 140 S.W.3d 660, 673
(Tex. 2004) (re-zoning).
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type of regulation associated with traditional nuisance law.
Acknowledging this would have made it more difficult to conclude that the
law did not impose a taking. Then-Justice Rehnquist's dissent cited the
nuisance cases and argued their relevance,69 but Justice Brennan chose not
to respond. This may have left the impression in some that Penn Central had
abolished the relevance of the nuisance analogy from regulatory takings law.
As we have seen, however, this would be mistaken. Previous decisions,
including foundational precedents such as Mugler v. Kansas,7 0
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,7  Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,72 and
Miller v. Schoene," had all drawn on nuisance law as a benchmark in
interpreting the scope of the police power.74 And the Court would turn again
to the relevance of nuisance after Penn Central in Keystone and Lucas.75
The lower courts that have adverted to the point have agreed that the
nuisance analogy should be included as part of the character analysis. 6
Most striking perhaps is the marathon litigation in the Federal Claims Court
under the name Rose Acre Farms v. United States.n Rose Acre was a major
egg producer, some of whose egg factories tested positive for salmonella
bacteria. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), as a precautionary
measure, ordered that all eggs from these facilities be diverted to the
"breaker egg" market, where they would be used in producing cake mixes
68. Penn Cent Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104,145-46 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 145-46.
70. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668-69, 671-74 (1887).
71. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
72. Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387-88 (1926).
73. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 280 (1928)
74. See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN 112-25 (1985) (developing a nuisance control interpretation of the police power).
75. See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
76. E.g., Crepple v. United States, 41 F.3d 627, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Walcek v. United States,
49 Fed. Cl. 248, 272 (2001); United States v. Brace, 48 Fed. Cl. 272, 278 (2000). After Lucas, the
Federal Circuit briefly made nuisance law the key component of the character factor, to the point of
virtually discarding the ad hoc test. See Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1179
(Fed. Cir. 1994).
The effect, then, of Lucas was to dramatically change the [character]
criterion, from one in which courts, including federal courts, were called upon to
make ad hoc balancing decisions, balancing private property rights against state
regulatory policy, to one in which state property law, incorporating common law
nuisance doctrine, controls.
Id. After the Supreme Court's Palazzolo decision, the Federal Circuit withdrew from this extreme
position, not discarding the nuisance analogy but expanding it broadly to include "the purpose of the
regulation and its desired effects" under the character factor. Bass Enters. Prod. Co. v. United States,
381 F.3d 1360, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
77. Rose Acre Farms, Inc. v. United States (Rose Acre1), 373 F.3d 1177 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Rose
Acre Farms, Inc. v. United States (Rose Acre ll), 559 F.3d 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
78. RoseAcre I, 373 F.3d at 1182.
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and such, rather than the "table egg" market. The breaker egg market pays
less than the table egg market, and Rose Acre filed suit in the Claims Court
seeking compensation for lost profits. 9 The trial court found the USDA's
egg regulations were "misguided," and held that this supported a finding of
a taking under Penn Central.80 In a lengthy opinion in 2004, Judge Michel,
writing for the Federal Circuit, overturned this ruling. Judge Michel,
quoting an earlier opinion, concluded that "[i]f the regulation prevents what
would or legally could have been a nuisance, then no taking occurred."81
After another trip down to the Claims Court and back again-during which
interval Lingle was decided-the Federal Circuit reaffirmed this
conclusion.82 The court concluded that Lingle left untouched the substantial
body of law indicating that laws designed to protect the public health and
safety are generally not takings, and that this should be taken into account
under the character factor of Penn Central.83
C Reciprocity ofAdvantage
A third theme developed in the lower courts picks up on the venerable
idea that reciprocity of advantage is an important factor in regulatory
takings cases. This idea, which initially appeared in Pennsylvania Coal, was
downplayed in the majority opinion in Penn Central and highlighted in the
dissent, again for fairly self-evident strategic reasons: the historic
preservation ordinance at issue burdened a relatively small number of
property owners for the benefit of the many. Looking only at the much-
quoted canonical paragraph from Penn Central, one might gain the
impression this factor no longer counts, since it is not mentioned. As we
have seen, however, Penn Central attempted in later paragraphs to portray
the historic preservation law as a general, community-wide measure, and
sought to argue that even restricted structures obtained some advantage
from the law, if not quite "reciprocal" advantage. 84 Keystone, for its part,
breathed new life into reciprocity of advantage by explicitly characterizing
79. Id. at 1183.
80. Id. at 1179, 1192.
81. Id. at 1192 (quoting Rose Acre Farms, Inc., v. United States, 55 Fed. Cl. 643, 659-60 (Fed.
Cir. 2004)).
82. Rose Acre I, 559 F.3d at 1281-82.
83. Id. at 1279. Other Federal Circuit decisions have spoken more broadly of the character
factor as requiring an assessment of "the purpose of the regulation and its desired effects." Bass Enters.
Prod. Co. v. United States, 381 F.3d 1360, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Although disconcertingly vague, in
context this appears to be roughly synonymous with whether the regulation seeks to proscribe the kinds
of harms regulated under the law of nuisance.
84. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 134-35 (1978).
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a mining-subsidence statute as having this feature and citing this as a reason
why the statute was not a taking.
Reciprocity of advantage focuses on the distributional impact of the
challenged governmental action. Regulations that impose burdens and
confer benefits on all property owners generally have a neutral
distributional impact. Everyone loses but everyone gains. An example
would be an ordinance requiring that all buildings in a crowded urban area
be constructed of fire-resistant material. Everyone pays higher construction
costs, but the risk of catastrophic fire is reduced and insurance rates go
down. Laws that generate these sorts of reciprocal burdens and benefits are
often associated with the police power and rarely require compensation."
In contrast, regulations that impose burdens exclusively on some
owners while generating benefits for others have a skewed distributional
impact. The most extreme form would be a law that takes from A and gives
to B, often cited as something that would violate the public use requirement
of the Takings Clause.88 The most extreme forms of skewed distribution, on
this view, are not permissible even under the power of eminent domain.
Short of outright A-to-B transfers, traditional exercises of eminent domain
typically have a skewed distributional impact, with the property of a few
being taken for a project that benefits the many, and of course
compensation is required in these cases. Thus, the presence of reciprocity of
advantage seems like an appropriate proxy for police power regulations,
and its absence is at least somewhat indicative of an action closer to
eminent domain.
Several lower courts have picked up on the idea that the character
factor is designed to measure the distributional impact of the challenged
governmental action. These courts favor broad-based laws that offer
reciprocity of advantage and find suspect laws that single out particular
owners for severe burdens while conferring benefits on others. One of the
85. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,491-92 (1987).
86. Mark W. Cordes, The Fairness Dimension in Takings Jurisprudence, 20 KAN. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 1, 21 (2010).
87. Sax, supra note 24, at 74-75.
88. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477 (2005).
89. Reciprocity of advantage has no clear home within the Penn Central three-part formula. It
has been considered as part of the investment-backed expectations prong. E.g., Adams v. Village of
Wesley Chapel, 259 F. App'x 545, 549 n.2 (4th Cir. 2007); Klauser ex rel. Whitehorse v. Babbitt, 918 F.
Supp. 274, 277-78 (W.D. Wis. 1996). It has also been considered under the character prong. E.g.,
Hendler v. United States, 36 Fed. Cl. 574, 588 (1996). And it has been considered as part of an
economic impact analysis. E.g., Meier v. Anderson, 692 F. Supp. 546, 555 (E.D. Pa. 1988); see also
Sadowsky v. City of New York, 732 F.2d 312, 319 (2d Cir. 1984) (finding that regulation was a burden
necessary to secure "the advantage of living and doing business in a civilized community" (quoting
Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 67 (1979))).
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first lower court decisions to engage in such an analysis emerged from
marathon Federal Circuit litigation in the Cienega Gardens case. 90 The
federal government had adopted a program that provided mortgage
insurance for multi-family residential housing, which lowered the effective
interest rate developers would otherwise have to pay.91 In return, the
developers agreed to cap rents on the projects for at least twenty years.92
After that, they could elect to pre-pay the mortgages and withdraw from the
program, raising rents to market levels.93 As the twenty-year pre-pay date
approached, housing advocates became concerned that large numbers of
low-income rental units would be taken off the market.94 Congress was
prevailed upon to adopt legislation in 1987 and 1990 eliminating the opt-out
privilege.95 After many trips back and forth between the Federal Claims
Court and the Federal Circuit, a panel of the Federal Circuit held that the
repeal was a taking under the Penn Central test.
Presumably because the economic impact of the repeal was not
draconian, the Cienega Gardens court placed primary emphasis on the
character of the governmental action factor. The court briefly suggested that
the repeal might be considered a physical invasion, because it had the effect
of forcing landlords to continue renting to low-income tenants they
otherwise would be free to evict.9 7 But it did not press the argument,
perhaps because it was in obvious tension with the Supreme Court's
decision in Yee v. City of Escondido." Instead, the court shifted gears,
suggesting that the character of the action was akin to a taking because,
although "Congress acted for a public purpose (to benefit a certain group of
people in need of low-cost housing), . . . just as clearly[] the expense was
placed disproportionately on a few private property owners."99 The court
concluded that "this is not a case in which the burden for remedying a
societal problem has been imposed on all of society. . . . The
disproportionate imposition on the Owners of the public's burden of
90. Cienega Gardens v. United States, 331 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
91. Id. at 1325.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1325-26.
94. Id. at 1326 (citing H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 100-426, at 192 (1987)).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1353.
97. Id at 1388.
98. Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 532 (1992). The Court in Yee held that a
California law forcing landlords to continue leasing to tenants at controlled rents did not violate
Loretto's categorical rule against permanent occupations. Id. at 532.
99. Cienega Gardens, 331 F.3d at 1338.
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providing low-income housing is not rendered any more acceptable by
worthiness of purpose."'"
The Minnesota Supreme Court has also interpreted the character factor
as incorporating an inquiry into reciprocity of advantage. In Wensmann
Realty, Inc. v. City of Eagan the court considered a Penn Central challenge
to a city's denial of a zoning amendment that would allow an aging golf
course to be turned into a low-density residential development.o'0 The
property owner claimed that the golf course was unprofitable, and that by
insisting that the land be zoned for parks, open space, and recreation, "the
city has placed an extreme burden on one property owner while benefiting
the public as a whole with open space for which the city did not pay." 0 2
The Minnesota Supreme Court agreed. Although it said the character
analysis is contextual, "an important consideration involves whether the
regulation is general in application or whether the burden of the regulation
falls disproportionately on relatively few property owners." 03 The court
found the zoning designation flunked this test, and concluded: "We have
trouble discerning any reciprocity of advantage resulting from the
comprehensive plan designation for the property."%51 4
Cienega Gardens and Wensmann were in turn followed by a panel
decision of the Ninth Circuit in Guggenheim v. City of Goleta.'os This was
another rent-control case, this time involving rents charged on mobile home
pads. Several California communities have adopted similar rent-control
schemes.'"0 California law allows mobile home tenants to select their
successors in selling their homes without regard to the wishes of the
landlord.'o7 By combining this law with local laws strictly controlling the
rents landlords can charge for pads, local governments can transfer the
economic rent associated with the scarcity value of the pad from the owner
of the land to the tenant. 08 The Supreme Court in Yee v. City of Escondido
held that such a scheme could not be characterized as a permanent physical
occupation of the landlord's property and declined to reach the Penn
100. Id. at 1340.
101. Wensmann Realty, Inc. v. City of Eagan, 734 N.W.2d 623, 633 (Minn. 2007).
102. Id. at 640.
103. Id. at 639.
104. Id. at 641.
105. Guggenheim v. City of Goleta (Guggenheim 1), 582 F.3d 996 (9th Cir. 2009).
106. Id. at 1034.
107. Id. at 1000 (quoting Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 523 (1992)).
108. Id. at 1020 (quoting Yee, 503 U.S. at 530).
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Central issue.1" In Guggenheim, Judge Bybee's opinion for the panel
majority found the scheme to be a taking under the Penn Central test." 0
With respect to the character factor, Judge Bybee observed that two
interpretations were possible. The first was invasion versus use
regulation."' The second "considers whether the challenged regulation
places a high burden on a few private property owners that should more
fairly be apportioned more broadly among the tax base."' 1 2 Although he
stated (without any support) that the distinction between invasion and
regulation interpretation "applied less frequently in practice" than the
distributional interpretation, he concluded that the rent-control scheme failed
under the second, distributional interpretation of the character factor."'
After a further rehearing en banc, the Bybee opinion was vacated and
the rent-control statute upheld.' 14 The new majority opinion, by Judge
Kleinfeld, did not reach the character factor. He found that the statute could
not be said to interfere with any investment-backed expectations, because
the rent-control scheme was in effect when the current challengers acquired
their property, and this was impacted in the price they paid.' He deemed
this sufficiently decisive that it was unnecessary to consider the character
factor." 6 Judge Bea's dissent, echoing the Bybee panel opinion, found that
the ordinance was suspect under the character factor because it placed "a
high burden on a few private property owners instead of apportioning the
burden more broadly among the tax base."ll 7
The en banc decision in Guggenheim means that it is an open question
in the Ninth Circuit whether the character factor incorporates the idea of
skewed distributional impact. Reciprocity of advantage has nevertheless
been adopted as part of the character analysis by the Federal Circuit and the
Minnesota Supreme Court, and it would not be surprising to see this
understanding advanced in other decisions in the future.
D. Governmental Enterprise
Another interpretation of the character factor hinted at in Penn Central
is that it adopts Professor Sax's distinction between government acting in
109. Yee, 503 U.S. at 528.
110. Guggenheim 1, 582 F.3d at 1034.
111. Id. at 1027.
112. Id. at l028.
113. Id. at 1027-30.
114. Guggenheim v. City of Goleta (Guggenheim fl), 638 F.3d 1111, 1116 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
115. Id.atll20.
116. Id.atll21.
117. Id. at 1132 (citing Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
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an enterprise as opposed to an arbitral capacity."'8 The Court characterized
the U.S. military as having acted in an "enterprise" capacity in building an
airfield next to the Causby farm and then using the Causby's air rights as a
path of glide for bombers taking off and landing." 9
At least one lower court has taken the hint and developed it into a full-
fledged doctrine. In a case decided shortly after Penn Central, the
Minnesota Supreme Court considered a municipal ordinance that restricted
development within an airport runway safety zone. 12 0 A municipal airport is
a governmental enterprise, the court reasoned in McShane v. City of
Faribault, and just compensation should be paid for restrictions on
development of property surrounding the airport needed to support its
operations. 121 McShane cited Penn Central and its discussion of the
character of the governmental action in support of this conclusion. 12 2
Wensmann, the previously mentioned reciprocity-of-advantage decision,
appeared to interpret McShane as simply an application of federal takings
law, suggesting that the distinction between enterprise and arbitration had
fallen out of favor.123 More recently, however, in DeCook v. Rochester
International Airport Joint Zoning Board, the Minnesota Supreme Court
clarified that McShane was grounded in state constitutional law, not federal
law, and that Minnesota law requires that landowners be paid for lost
development rights due to airport expansion. 124 The court wrote:
In McShane, we drew a distinction between zoning
regulations such as those that implement comprehensive land-use
plans, under which "a reciprocal benefit and burden accru[es] to
all landowners from the planned and orderly development of land
use," and zoning regulations enacted "for the sole benefit of a
governmental enterprise," such as the Faribault airport. We
referred to the former as "arbitration" regulations and gave as an
example regulations that implement a comprehensive land-use
plan. For the latter-which we called "enterprise"
regulations-we held that "where land use regulations, such as
the airport zoning ordinance here, are designed to benefit a
specific public or governmental enterprise, there must be
118. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 135 (1978); see also Sax, supra
note 24, at 69 (arguing that takings law should distinguish between government "enterprise" and
government as "arbiter").
119. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 135.
120. McShane v. City of Faribault, 292 N.W.2d 253, 255 (Minn. 1980).
121. Id. at 258-59.
122. Id. at 258.
123. Wensmann Realty, Inc. v. City of Eagan, 734 N.w.2d 623, 641 n.14 (Minn. 2007).
124. DeCook v. Rochester Int'l Airport Joint Zoning Bd., 796 N.W.2d 299, 306-07 (Minn. 2011).
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compensation to landowners whose property has suffered a
substantial and measurable decline in market value as a result of
the regulations.' 25
So at least one court, albeit as a matter of state constitutional law, has
interpreted the character factor as incorporating Sax's test distinguishing
between enterprise and arbitration.12 6
E. Retroactivity
Not surprisingly, there is also some suggestion in the lower court cases
that retroactive regulations are to be assessed with greater skepticism under
the character factor.12 7 This of course was the interpretation of the character
factor adopted by Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion in Eastern
Enterprises.
Perhaps the best example is American Pelagic Fishing Co. v. United
States.12 8 The plaintiffs purchased a large freezer trawler outfitted for
fishing Atlantic mackerel and herring in the U.S. exclusive economic
zone.12 9 The relevant federal agency issued the required permits for one
year, which would ordinarily be renewed in subsequent years.13 0 The size of
the vessel provoked controversy among incumbent permit holders, and after
hearings in which the vessel was singled out as a cause for concern
Congress passed appropriations riders cancelling permits for any Atlantic
mackerel and herring vessel above a certain size-of which the plaintiffs'
vessel was the only one.13' As a result of this action, the vessel's permits
were cancelled.13 2 The plaintiff owners alleged, without contradiction, that
the vessel could not be operated profitably in any other fishing ground and
had been sold at a substantial loss. 3 3 The plaintiffs claimed a regulatory
taking, and the Claims Court agreed.134 Looking to the character factor, the
court interpreted the plurality opinion in Eastern Enterprises to mean that
125. Id. at 306 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting McShane, 292 N.W.2d at 257-59).
126. Accord Interstate Cos. v. City of Bloomington, 790 N.W.2d 409, 415 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010).
127. E.g., Lost Tree Vill. Corp. v. United States, 100 Fed. Cl. 412,438 (2011); Brace v. United States,
72 Fed. Cl. 227,356 (2006); Carolina Power & Light Co. v. United States, 48 Fed. Cl. 35,49 (2000).
128. Am. Pelagic Fishing Co. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 36 (Fed. Cl. 2001) rev'd on other
grounds, 379 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Cienega Gardens, involving legislative abrogation of a right to
pre-pay insured mortgages, could have rested on this ground, but it did not. Cienega Gardens v. United
States, 331 F.3d 1319, 1325 (Fed Cir. 2003).
129. Am. Pelagic Fishing Co., 49 Fed. Cl. at 38.
130. Id. at 40-42.
131. Id. at 42.
132. Id. at 44.
133. Id at 37.
134. Id. at 50.
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where "the action is retroactive in effect" and "is targeted at a particular
individual," this supports a finding of a taking.'3 5 On appeal, the Federal
Circuit reversed without reaching the retroactivity argument, finding that
the plaintiffs' fishing permits did not constitute "private property" for
purposes of the Fifth Amendment.' 36
F. Substantially Advances a Legitimate Governmental Interest
In Penn Central the Court remarked in passing that "a use restriction
on real property may constitute a 'taking' if not reasonably necessary to the
effectuation of a substantial public purpose."'3 This was paraphrased in
Agins v. City of Tiburon as asking whether a regulation "substantially
advance[s] legitimate state interests." 38 Not surprisingly, some lower courts
took this to mean that the "substantially advances" question should be
folded into Penn Central via the character factor.'" In Lingle, the Court
disavowed the "substantially advances" inquiry, finding that it focused on
the rationality of the government regulation-whether the means were
rationally related to a legitimate end-and that this was a matter for the Due
Process Clause, not the Takings Clause.140
After Lingle, lower courts will predictably avoid considering the
reasonableness of a government regulation in determining whether the
character of the action points toward the need for compensation. In previous
writing, I have questioned whether this is necessarily correct.141 Lingle was
right to disavow any facial takings test keyed to the reasonableness of the
government regulation, which is the way the Agins language had been
developed in the Ninth Circuit. Arguably, however, the rationality of a
regulation might be relevant in an ad hoc inquiry trying to locate a
regulation along a spectrum ranging from clear cases of eminent domain to
135. Id.
136. Am. Pelagic Fishing Co. v. United States, 379 F.3d 1363, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Other
Federal Circuit decisions have likewise denied takings claims involving the revocation of permits and
licenses on the ground that these interests are not constitutional property. See Mitchell Arms, Inc. v.
United States, 7 F.3d 212, 217 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (holding that retroactive revocation of a firearms
importation license was not a taking, even if the products had already been imported); Conti v. United
States, 48 Fed. Cl. 532, 538-40 (2001) (holding that a retroactive policy banning the use of a specific
type of gill-net was not a taking of a fishing company's property).
137. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978) (citing Nectow v. City
of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928); Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 513-14 (1977)
(Stevens, J., concurring)).
138. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (citing Nectow, 277 U.S. at 188).
139. E.g., Smith v. Town of Mendon, 822 N.E.2d 1214, 1221 (N.Y. 2004).
140. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 544-45 (2005).
141. Thomas W. Merrill, Why Lingle Was HalfRight, 11 VT. J. ENvTL. L. 421,430-31 (2010).
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clear cases of the police power. If a regulation substantially advances a
legitimate governmental interest, this is some evidence it is a valid police
power measure. If it does not, this is some evidence that it is motivated by
some other motive, perhaps expropriatory in nature. I admit the inference
value here is weak, and that other tests like reciprocity of advantage, the
nuisance analogy, and the distinction between enterprise and arbitration
may have better traction. In any event, given the emphatic rejection of the
"substantially advances" test in Lingle, it will not reappear anytime soon in
lower court takings cases.
CONCLUSION: THE PROPER ROLE OF THE CHARACTER FACTOR
Penn Central remains a cornerstone in the architecture of the
regulatory takings doctrine. The central insight of the decision-that the
hardest cases cannot be resolved without engaging in a case-specific
analysis of the particular facts-is sound and unlikely to be repudiated.
Nevertheless, the understanding of the relevant variables that courts should
consider in engaging in these inquiries needs further refinement and
development, which only the Supreme Court can provide.
The starting point is recognizing that Penn Central, like the regulatory
takings doctrine more generally, is a decisional tool for differentiating
between governmental powers, in particular between the power of eminent
domain and the police power. The general strategy for differentiating
among governmental powers, as I have previously argued, is to start with
ideal typical situations governed by one power or the other, then reason by
analogy from these settled understandings in fitting novel situations into the
picture.14 2 Viewed from this perspective, the Court's categorical rules can
be seen as isolating situations where we are highly confident the
governmental action always should be (or always should not be-there are
categorical rules of non-liability as well) a taking. The Penn Central test
occupies a gray zone in between these categorical tests, where we are
unsure about whether to treat the governmental action as sufficiently like
eminent domain that compensation is required. Hence, more facts are
required before we reach a final decision about the matter.
In resolving the cases that fall into the gray zone, there is no reason
why we should limit ourselves to the three variables that were fortuitously
elevated to the status of a formulaic test in the wake of Penn Central:
diminution in value, investment-backed expectations, and invasions versus
142. See generally DANA & MERRILL, supra note 15, at 86-164.
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use regulations. 143 The Court in Penn Central intimated that there is more to
the character of the governmental action than invasions versus regulations;
it suggested that the generality and reciprocity of a regulation also bear on
the inquiry. Later Supreme Court decisions have pointed to correspondence
with traditional nuisance law, average reciprocity of advantage, and
retroactivity as relevant considerations under the Penn Central approach.1 "
Lower court decisions have likewise focused not just on invasions but also
nuisance law, reciprocity of advantage, retroactivity, and the distinction
between enterprise and arbitration as elements to be considered under the
character analysis.145
The important lesson in all this is that the ad hoc inquiry mandated by
Penn Central should not be artificially confined to just three factors, or
even to factors that suggest a connection to traditional exercises of eminent
domain. Courts should consider all factors that have enduring persuasive
force in differentiating governmental powers, including factors suggesting
the governmental action falls toward the police power end of the spectrum.
Thus, courts should consider diminution in value, whether the action singles
out the property owner for unusually burdensome treatment, and whether
the action is designed to implement a governmental enterprise; i.e., factors
that point toward a similarity with exercises of eminent domain.
Additionally, courts should consider whether the action regulates something
that could be regarded as a nuisance at common law, operates prospectively
rather than retroactively, and seeks to arbitrate among competing land uses;
i.e., factors that point toward a similarity with exercises of the police power.
As to which factors should be given more or less emphasis, further
work needs to be done. Now that the Court has made it clear that the
function of the regulatory takings doctrine is to identify actions that are
"functionally equivalent" to eminent domain,14 6 one would think the critical
inquiry would be empirical in nature: Does the challenged governmental
action transfer rights that ordinarily would be acquired by a purchase of
rights or the exercise of eminent domain in the relevant political
jurisdiction? 4 7 For whatever reasons, the Supreme Court has not yet
perceived the relevance of actual practice in property markets in resolving
143. See supra note 34 and accompanying text (discussing the transformation of the Penn
Central decision into a formulaic test composed of three variables).
144. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (describing the Court's adherence to the nuisance
doctrine); supra note 85 and accompanying text (noting Keystone's revival of average reciprocity of
advantage); supra note 58 and accompanying text (citing recognition of retroactivity as a factor in
Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion in Eastern Enterprises).
145. See discussion of lower court cases supra Part L.
146. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005).
147. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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regulatory takings cases. Perhaps the Court is uncomfortable with the idea
that constitutional rights might vary with conditions in local property
markets; perhaps the Court has simply not had occasion to consider the
point given the dearth of opportunities to develop the ad hoc approach
associated with Penn Central. There is, however, no reason why takings
claimants (or opponents) should await the green light from the Supreme
Court before developing such evidence through expert testimony and
presenting it to courts for their consideration. Such evidence would be
logically relevant to the "functional equivalence" question, and would seem
more probative than the various proxies for equivalence identified in Penn
Central and lower court decisions following Penn Central.
If we are limited to the proxies, i.e., the factors identified in Penn
Central and other decisions applying the ad hoc approach, I am inclined to
think that some of the themes identified by the lower courts in interpreting
the character factor-including the nuisance analogy, average reciprocity of
advantage, and retroactivity-are more probative in situating governmental
action between eminent domain and police power poles than are two of the
variables highlighted in Penn Central, namely, diminution in value and
investment-backed expectations. As previously noted, these two factors are
notoriously indeterminate and circular. 14 8 But one can hardly expect the
Court to engage in wholesale revisionism in applying the Penn Central
approach. What is needed is serious attention to the factors, through a
process of adjustment and trial and error, until the right mix of variables
with the right emphasis is developed.
Penn Central, read as one decision in a line of precedent rather than a
formulaic test handed down like a legislative code, is broadly consistent
with this approach. The key move going forward is to interpret the
"character of the governmental action" as encompassing a variety of
considerations historically deemed to be relevant in distinguishing between
eminent domain and the police power. Interpreting the character factor in
this fashion would be broadly consistent with both Supreme Court and
lower court precedent and would move the ad hoc analysis mandated by
Penn Central in the right direction.
148. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
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